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WELLINGTON'S LABORS
MICHAEL

I.

H.

Go'ITESMAN*

TEACHING LABOR

My first class as a student at Yale Law School was the first class
Harry Wellington taught there. It was the Fall of 1956. The course was
Contracts. Harry entered the classroom, looking no older than the students (in truth, he 'wasn't much older), but surely better dressed. He
settled himself on the corner of the desk, and the magic began.
Without introduction or fanfare, Harry embarked on a monologue about a magazine that kept arriving, uninvited, in his mailbox
each month. He confessed to leafing through the pages from time to
time, and wondered if this obligated him to pay for it.
We, of course, presumed to know full well what magazine he was
talking about. Playboy had begun publication just two years before,
and leafing through the pages seemed a sensible strategy, at least to
the 95% of us who were men. We were probably wrong, but our assumption that Playboy was the subject of inquiry fueled our interest,
and Harry didn't dampen enthusiasm by making full disclosure.
We discussed Harry's quandary-did he have to pay?-throughout the course. But we didn't arrive at an answer, and Harry didn't
proffer one. The joy was in the inquiry, not the answer. Thus did
Harry whet our appetite for the legal enterprise.
I was so exhilarated by this experience that when it came time to
pick courses for our second semester (Yale even then allowed first year
students to elect one of their Spring courses) my sole interest was finding out "what's Harry teaching?" The answer was "Labor Law," and I
enrolled. I had no idea what the course was about: I had no union
members in my background, and no awareness of even meeting a
union member. The clashes of labor and management had never
before engaged my interest. But if Harry was teaching, I was taking.
And so were many of my classmates.
That course determined my career. I learned that this was a field
where there were "sides," and I realized, notwithstanding my prior indifference, that I was fully committed to one of those sides. What
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Harry added-what made this field downright irresistible-was intellectual richness. This was not a course, as so many labor law courses
are, in which the focus is on the strategic use of the law by contending
economic forces. This was a course in federalism, in separation of
powers, in legal process, in reconciling a national commitment to competition with a preference for allowing unions to end competition in
the sale of one of the raw materials of production (that is, labor). To
pursue a "cause" in so rich an intellectual arena was a calling too good
to resist.
In the late '50s, Yale experimented with a "divisional program," in
which students pursued a "major" during their fourth and fifth semesters of law school. One of the options was a major in Labor Law, and
many of us chose it. We had the happy experience of avo very different mentors: intellectualizing with Harry, real-world strategizing with
Clyde Summers. The divisional program didn't survive long, but its
demise surely was not attributable to the labor law division. We all
loved it!
We didn't know, of course, that private sector unionization in
America-then at its zenith, with nearly 40% of private sector workers
unionized-was about to experience a mammoth free-fall. That began
in earnest with the increase in global competition in the 1960's, as Europe and Asia finally rebounded from the devastation of World War II.
Today, union density in the private sector hovers at about 10%.1 Nor
did we realize that public sector unionism, then hardly noticeable, would
soon explode to fill the void. The social activism of the late 1960's
marked the onset of that phenomenon.
At all odds, I graduated Yale in 1959, and began a near thirty-year
career as a union lawyer, riding the escalator down in the private sector, and up in the public sector. In the first few years, I would proudly
send copies of my more ambitious briefs to Harry. In each case, I
would get a polite letter back, saying that he had read the brief with
interest, although of course he didn't agree with the position I had
taken. (The "of course" was a bit of a surprise: Harry, the ultimate
teacher, had not tipped his hand in the classroom as to where he
stood.) After a while, I took the hint, and stopped sending. But Harry
was always there as I drafted those briefs: his was the standard of intellectual rigor those briefs had to meet.
1. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 3,
Union Members in 1999 Gan. 19, 2000), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
union2.nrO.htm).[hereinafter Union Members].
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And, .of CQurse, when I began teaching, fQr a decade as an adjunct,
and then full-time, my gQal was tQ emulate what I remembered mQst
fQndly abQut my .own law schQQI career: Harry's teaching. Indeed, I
even vQlunteered tQ teach CQntracts, SQ that I CQuid cQnfrQnt my students with Harry's unsQlicited magazine hypQthetical. SQmehQw, it
didn't spark the same excitement in my classrQQm. Was it the different
era, .or just an insufficiency .of magic .on the CQrner .of the desk?

ll.

WRITING ABOUT LABOR

ThQugh he later went .on tQ becQme an impQrtant cQnstitutiQnal
schQlar, Harry's early schQlarship was predQminantly abQut lab .or law.
Between 1955 and 1976, he authQred .or co-authQred three bQQks .on
lab .or law, and mQre than a dQzen law review articles. There aren't
many peQple whQ CQuld co-authQr .one bQQk with Ralph Winter and
anQther with Clyde Summers, yet anQther testament tQ the subtlety
and disinterestedness .of Harry's intellectual reach.
Given tQday's predQminance .of public sectQr uniQnism, I want tQ
recall briefly the bQQk Harry co-authQred with Ralph Winter in 1971,
The Unions and the Cities. 2 They saw that public emplQyment was the
emerging gwwth area fQr uniQnizatiQn. In the decade befQre their
bQQk, the number .of public emplQyees in America had increased mQre
than 50%3, and the number represented by uniQns had grQwn exponentially tQ nearly tWQ milliQn. As this rise cQincided with the start .of
the decline in private sectQr uniQnism, public sectQr emplQyees had
risen in that decade frQm 5% tQ 11 % .of America's uniQnized wQrkers.4
I wQnder whether WellingtQn and Winter envisiQned hQW enQrmQUS WQuld be the future grQwth .of public sectQr uniQnism. TQday,
there are nearly eight milliQn public emplQyees represented by uniQns-fQur times the number when they wrQte their bQQk. Public emplQyees nQW cQnstitute 43.6% .of the nearly 18 milliQn uniQnrepresented emplQyees in America, cQmpared tQ 11 % then. 5 Despite a
crazy-quilt .of state laws that regulate public emplQyee uniQnizatiQn,
uniQn density in the public sectQr has surpassed the peak attained in
2. See liARRy H. WELLINGTON & RALPH K WINTER,JR., THE UNION AND THE CrrrES
(1971).
3. See id. at 33-34.
4. See WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 3, at 34.
5. See Union Members, supra note 2. Table 3 shows 10,104,000 private wage and
salary workers represented by unions, and 7,815,000 government workers represented
by unions.
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the private sector in the 1950's. Today, 42.1 % of all the public employees in America are represented by unions. 6
The Unions and the Cities was prompted by what Wellington and
Winter saw as troubling signs in the public sector: politicians' capitulations, in the face of strike threats, to what they (the authors) thought
were extravagant union demands. States and cities were then considering what set of legal rules and institutions would regulate public sector
collective bargaining, and the authors feared that they would unthinkingly adopt those that had long prevailed in the private sector. Their
book undertook to show that differences in the public sector justified
radically different legal rules and institutions.
The Wellington-Winter thesis was rooted in public choice theory,
although it wasn't called that then. Their central insights can be discerned by examining their position on two important issues.
A.

Should Public Employees Be Allowed To Strike?

The right to strike is the centerpiece of national labor policy in
the private sector. As Justice Brennan explained for the Supreme
Court, in Insurance Agents v NLRB:7
[CJollective bargaining ... cannot be equated with an
academic collective search for truth. . .. The parties ...
proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest. The system has not
reached the ideal of the philosophic notion that perfect
understanding among people would lead to perfect
agreement among them on values. The presence oj economic
weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the
parties, is part and parcel oj the system that the Wagner and
Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized. . .. [AJ t the present
statutory stage of our national labor relations policy, the
two factors - necessity for good-faith bargaining between
parties, and the availability of economic pressure devices
to each to make the other party incline to agree on one's
terms - exist side by side. 8
But Wellington and Winter urged that strikes in public employment be banned, and their argument for that position diverged radi6.
7.
8.

See Union Members, supra note 2.
See 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
!d. at 488-89 (emphasis added).
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cally from that of others who then opposed public sector strikes. The
usual argument advanced for banning such strikes was that public employees perform vital services that can't be interrupted. But as Wellington and Winter showed, that argument is ultimately unpersuasive,
and if that ,vas all that could be advanced in opposition, the union's
quest for a right to strike was likely to carry the day. They recognized
that some public employees do indeed perform services so vital that
the public cannot afford their interruption: police and fire are the paradigmatic examples. But the case cannot be made that a strike by most
other categories of public workers-park employees, tax collectors, or
even teachers-would be more harmful to society than lawful strikes in
some parts of the private sector (e.g., transportation and basic manufacturing industries).
Wellington and Winter opposed public sector strikes for quite a
different reason. Public employees, in their quest for higher wages,
are competing against other citizens with other claims on what is ultimately a limited public fisc. If, alone among the citizen claimants, public employees can rely not only on their lobbying power (the weapon
enjoyed by all claimants) but also their capacity to disrupt public services, they will enjoy an inflated arsenal that will give primacy to their
demands over competing claimants, and the end result may be a socially-undesirable allocation of public resources. This is especially so,
Wellington and Winter argued, because public officials will be more
likely to surrender to unreasonable union demands backed by strike
threats than will their private sector counterparts. Public officials are
motivated by electoral concerns, not the bottom line. If satisfying
worker's immediate demands and thus avoiding strikes keeps the public happy in the short run, elected officials are unlikely to stand fast
against union demands and unleash a strike that disrupts public services and may rebound to their political disadvantage. They will instead take the short-term expedient route: yield to the union's
extravagant demands, and visit the ultimate public price for that surrender-reduced expenditures on other government services, or increased taxes-in later omnibus bills where the causal role of the
earlier surrender will be undetectable.
B.

What Should Be the Scope of Bargaining in the Public Sector?

Wellington and Winter assumed, appropriately on the basis offederallabor law at the time they wrote, that unions in the private sector
have a right to bargain over every issue that directly affects employees'
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interests. 9 They urged that a narrower stance be adopted in laws regulating public employee bargaining. As they explained, many issues
that directly affect employees also have larger implications for society
as a whole. Two examples: should there be public review boards to
resolve police misconduct claims? Should class size in public schools
be reduced, and if so by how much?
Remitting these issues to collective bargaining, they warned,
would provide unions a forum in which their voices would be heard to
the exclusion of other citizens, and in which if bargaining was to succeed decisions would be reached without a chance for the input of
others. As a next-best alternative, they argued that if these subjects
were to be bargainable, the usual procedures for bargaining should be
changed so that there could be meaningful input by all other interested citizens before decisions were made.
Wellington and Winter did not stop with alarms about the right to
strike and the scope of bargaining. They went on in their book to
examine every other aspect of private sector labor law, including, for
example, the shaping of bargaining units and the means for enforcing
collective bargaining agreements once reached. In virtually every instance, they saw problems with automatic importation to the public
sector, suggesting instead modifications of private sector doctrine to
meet their concerns about public sector differences. Their methodology throughout was built upon their central premise, reiterated provocatively in their postscript:
[T] he principal issue in public employee unionism is the
distribution of political power among those groups press9. Section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act requires employers to
bargain with unions chosen as employees' exclusive bargaining representatives over
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. At the time they wrote, prevailing Supreme Court decisional law indicated that any matter falling within the broad
meaning of those terms is a mandatory subject of bargaining. See Fiberboard Paper Products Corp. v NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (contracting out of bargaining unit work a
mandatory subject of bargaining). It was not until a decade after Wellington and Winter wrote their book that the Supreme Court, for the first time, declared that employers
were not invariably required to bargain over entrepreneurial decisions that directly impacted on terms and conditions of employment, such as closing a plant. See First National Maintenance Corp. v NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). Holding that an employer need
not bargain over a decision to close part of its business - a decision that may cost many
employees their jobs - the Court created a presumption against employer obligation to
bargain over entrepreneurial decisions, which could be overcome only by showing that
the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business.
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ing claims on government. . .. [It] would seem that every
responsible union leader must be committed to the proposition that what's good for public employees is good for
the cities, counties, and states of the nation. Our rejection of that proposition has served as the major normative
premise of this book. We believe that in the cities, counties, and states there are other claimants with needs at
least as pressing as those of the public employees. Such
claimants can never have the power the unions will vYin if
we mindlessly import into the public sector all the collective bargaining practices developed in the private sector.
Make no mistake about it, government is not just another
industry.I0
At this gathering celebrating Harry, I will refrain from propounding my reactions to the book's proposals. Let me just say that I read
them with interest, although, of course, I didn't agree with them.
But, in the end, we can all be pleased. The law has developed
much as Wellington and Winter proposed. Yet, despite these departures from the private sector legal rules, public sector unionism has
prospered beyond anything ever achieved in the private sector.H
Most states forbid strikes by public employees, and the rest impose
limits on the right to strike that minimize the prospects of its exercise. 12 The states vary widely on the scope of mandatory bargaining,
but, in general, issues of paramount societal interest are not entrusted
to bargaining and/or are hedged around with safeguards such as Wellington and Winter proposed to assure that other citizens' voices are
heard before the decision is made.
It is quite possible that public sector unionism has thrived precisely because the right to strike is denied. The past two decades have
sho'wn that the private sector right to strike is a paper tiger, if employers are prepared to hire permanent replacements for the strikers. 13
The prospect ofjob loss through striking, and the absence of any other
mechanism for inducing an employer's submission to a collective bargaining agreement, have rendered unionization futile in most parts of
10. See WELLINGTON AND WINTER, supra note 3, at 202.
11. See Union Members, supra note 2.
12. In the handful of states pennitting strikes, the allowance does not extend to
jobs deemed too critical such as police and fire, and those who are permitted to strike
must first run a procedural gauntlet that maximizes the chance that agreement will be
reached thereby obviating the occasion for striking.
13. See Michael H. Gottesman, Union Summer: A Reawakened Interest in the Law of
Labor?, 1996 SUP. CT. REv. 285, 293-96.

HeinOnline -- 45 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 83 2001-2002

84

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

the private sector. 14 But the denial of a strike right in the public sector
is usually accompanied by the creation of some dispute-resolution
mechanism for settling the parties' differences: mediation, arbitration,
or the like. I5 Even where these do not exist, an organized constituency's lobbying power has proved sufficient to give public employees
enhanced leverage in competition with the more diffuse, and more
diffusely represented interests of the larger citizenry.
I learned legal process theory and public choice theory from
Harry. That education enabled me to understand why my public sector union clients prospered in a world of inhospitable legal rules.

14. [d.
15. See WELLINGTON &
cussed therein).

WINTER,

supra note 3, at 170 (these alternatives are dis-
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